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Abstract: This paper identifies the characteristic features of the different financial market players involved in the delivery of microcredit in the Philippines
and looks into their experiences in addressing the credit demand of the smallborrower market segment, particularly the microenterprise sector. This paper
argues that each group of lenders, specifically commercial banks, rural banks,
credit-granting NGOs, and an apex financial institution, allocates its funds by
establishing its own criteria for assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers and
its own mechanisms to avoid borrower default. The delivery of microcredit takes
place within an environment where the different financial market players face
their own set of constraints in supplying credit to small-scale borrowers. This is
made evident in the experiences of the different institutions in adopting the
approaches of downgrading, upgrading, and financial linkage building.

T

he goals of developing countries to attain increased employment,
equitable income levels, and self-sustained economic growth
are integrally related to the opportunity of low-income
entrepreneurs who have the potential to contribute to overall productivity. Although access to financial services by small and
microenterprises is identified as a key requisite in supporting enterprise
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growth and development, this is yet to be fully realized in many
developing economies. In the Asia-Pacific region, less than 5% of poor
households have financial service access, according to the Asia
Pacific Development Center (Getubig, Remenyi, & Quinonez,
1997).
This paper looks into the experience of financial institutions in
the Philippines in addressing the demand for credit of small-scale
borrowers, specifically of microenterprises. It begins with a discussion on the significant role played by the microenterprise sector in
the Philippines as an important source of income among poor
households. This is followed by a description of the Philippine
financial sector, with emphasis on the asymmetry in the allocation
of credit among the main financial market players. Within this
context of asymmetric credit allocation, the experiences of financial institutions involved in delivering financial services to the lowincome market segment is presented in the fourth section,
highlighting the institutional approaches of downgrading,
upgrading, and linkage building.

The Microenterprise Sector in the Philippines
In the Philippines, microenterprises consist of business activities
in industry, agriculture, and/or services, whether by single proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations that have asset sizes
amounting to P150,000 ($2,800) or below and a total workforce of
one to nine people. These enterprises are lumped together under
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), based on the Magna Carta
for Small Enterprises (Republic Act No. 8289, Philippine
Department of Trade & Industry, 1997). According to the 1993
Integrated Survey of Households Bulletin in the Philippines, half
of the persons employed in this sector are wage and salary workers
rather than owner-operators or members of the entrepreneur’s
family (Philippine National Statistics Office, 1993).
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Many poor Filipino families derive their income from multiple
sources. Data from the 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey
(APIS) reveal that, of the more than l4.4 million families
surveyed, 67% received income in the form of wages, 61%
received income from entrepreneurial activities, and 50% augmented their family income by engaging in family sustenance
activities (Philippine National Statistics Office, 1998).1 Among the
poorest 40% of the respondents, 70% depended on entrepreneurial activities rather than on wages or salaries for their income.
In 1999 , the reported share of wages and salaries as a source of
income continued to decrease by 0.8%, and entrepreneurial activities ranked third in the distribution of sources of income among
families surveyed. Among the families belonging to the first to the
third deciles, most of the income came from entrepreneurial activities, while those who belonged to the higher-income strata
obtained a bigger share of their income from wages and salaries.
Approximately 70.4% of the families in the lowest 40% income
group were reported to have businesses, compared to only 54.5% of
the families in the higher 60% of income strata.
Table 1. Total income derived and sources, 1998
(in Philippine pesos)
Economic Activities
TOTAL

Wages and Salaries
Family Sustenance

Net Share of Crops, etc.

Entrepreneurial Activities

Other Sources of Income

All Families

Income Strata
Lowest 40%
Highest 60%

868,860,662

92,233,275

10,587,079

5,810,681

419,549,518
5,472,832

214,547,668
218,703,565

%

776,627,389

89.38%

6.30%

4,776,398

0.62%

30,269,768

32.82%

1,210,318

1.31%

34,483,708
19,458,801

%

10.62%

38.47%

21.10%

389,279,751
4,262,517

179,063,959
199,244,764

50.12%

0.55%

23.06%

25.66%

Note. Total percentages are computed as a percentage of all families. Percentages for
other economic activities (wages, family sustenance, net share of crops, entrepreneurial
activities and others) are computed as a percentage of families in the respective income strata.
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The 1998 APIS also reveals that out of the 8.5 million surveyed families with businesses, only 25% had the chance to avail
themselves of credit to finance their entrepreneurial activities.
High interest rates, lack of collateral, and lack of information
about where to get loans were among the top three reasons cited by
families in the lower 40% income group for their inability to avail
themselves of credit for their businesses. In fact, the scarcity of
working capital and investment credit has been identified by small
and microentrepreneurs as the single greatest difficulty encountered
by the SME sector (ADB/OECD, 2000).
As of 2000, the total number of enterprises operating in the
Philippines was estimated at 820,960, generating employment of
about six million (Philippine National Statistics Office, 2000).
Microenterprises dominated this number (91.1%), followed by
small enterprises (8.2%). Among the establishments under the
wholesale and retail trade sector, 95.2% were microenterprises. On
the other hand, while enterprises in the manufacturing sector
showed a tendency to be relatively larger in size compared to the
wholesale and retail trade sector, microenterprises still dominated
the manufacturing sector with a share of 86.9%.
In terms of employment generation, micro, small, and medium
enterprises absorbed 69.6% of the workers in the formal sector.
Since enterprises in the wholesale and retail trade sector were primarily micro in size, the sector absorbed only 30.3% of the total,
62.2% of which were working in microenterprises. On the other
hand, the manufacturing sector employed a total of 1.6 million
workers (26.9% of the total), 45.9% of which were working for
large enterprises.
The available data in the Philippines on the growth in the
number of microenterprises show that these enterprises tend to multiply faster than any other type of enterprise. While small enterprises
doubled over the period of 1983 –1994, and medium and large
enterprises grew by 4% and 27%, respectively, the number of
microenterprises grew by as much as 62% (Small & Medium
Enterprise Development Council, 1998, cited in Berry, Rodriguez,
& Sandee, 1999).
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17,328

31,185

137,340

80,595

9,675

158,341

Source: Philippine National Statistics Office, 2000.

189,501

820,960 5,902,186

41,254

TOTAL

Other Services

28,414

272,202

430,884

262,165

301,035

Health & Social Work

40,477

Education

Real Estate

24,118

485,098

15,267

89,472

Financial Intermediation

Hotels & Restaurants

Transp’n & Comm’n

161,487

437,325 1,785,811

3,154

1,318

125,467 1,589,214

376

1,252

3,391

no. of
employees

TOTAL

no. of
enterprises

Wholesale & Retail Trade

Construction

Electricity, Gas & Water

Manufacturing

Mining

Fishing

Agriculture

INDUSTRY

7,602

2,746

354,025

1,209

2,227

6,478

no. of
employees

106,858

60,243

21,469

106,399

75,325

42,105

267,731

747,740 2,165,100

38,751

26,795

5,127

35,483

18,129

11,302

81,879

416,519 1,110,683

1,724

660

108,998

239

523

1,611

no. of
enterprises

MICRO

38,724

49,018

36,597

109,216

107,146

106,606

85,209

167,152

403,033

33,429

14,451

354,328

2,972

14,346

67,166 1,522,227

2,383

1,412

4,032

4,348

5,801

3,622

7,377

20,038

1,225

480

14,121

112

688

1,527

no. of
no. of
enterprises employees

SMALL

Table 2. Number of enterprises and employees by size and industry, 2000

3,070

67

116

306

291

82

168

152

438

93

90

1,110

12

18

127

416,686

9,329

15,761

41,983

40,866

11,013

22,641

19,173

12,863

12,863

12,850

150,734

1,568

2,248

16,986

MEDIUM

no. of
no. of
enterprises employees

24,296

45,740

99,534

176,473

69,221

151,080

31,042

213,424

107,593

50,548

730,127

11,579

12,364

75,152

2,984 1,798,173

53

91

210

355

106

175

64

330

112

88

1,238

13

23

126

LARGE

no. of
no. of
enterprises employees
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Microenterprises, given their characteristically small size of
operations, have very low start-up capital requirements. Although
they operate on short-term planning cycles, sometimes daily or
weekly, their requirements for working capital are relatively large,
covering the cost of raw materials and inventory. Their credit
requirements, apart from assuming characteristics which differ
fromthose of large, more established firms, also vary widely according to the developmental stage of the enterprise.2 Therefore,
supplying credit to microenterprises is an undertaking that many
financial institutions in the Philippines, especially those in the formal sector, still consider as unfamiliar territory.

The Challenge of Supplying Credit to
Microenterprises in the Philippines
An Overview of the Philippine Financial Sector
The Philippine financial sector consists of a relatively large network
of banking and nonbanking organizations performing various
financial intermediation services. The country’s financial system may
be classified into the following: (1) a formal sector under the
regulation and supervision of the Central Bank (Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas [BSP]) and the Insurance Commission; (2) a semiformal sector
composed of organizations under the supervision of the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), and non-government organizations
(NGOs) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) but not subject to any regulation of their financial operations by any government agency; and (3) a purely informal sector
composed of unregistered individual operators or organizations
neither supervised nor regulated by any government entity.
The formal sector is composed of commercial banks, thrift
banks, rural banks, and nonbank financial institutions. In the
Philippines, the formal sector lies at the center of the general banking system, accounting for 81% of the entire assets, as of the end of
1998 (Llanto, 2000). According to Llanto (2000), within the banking system, more than 50 commercial banks account for the bulk
of the volume of finance, including as much as 90% of the sector’s
118

Volume 6 Number 2

Deliver y of Microcredit in the Philippines

assets, while the resources of the 117 thrift banks and more than
800 rural banks make up only 7.7% and 2% of the banking system, respectively. The semiformal sector is composed of credit
unions, cooperatives, and a number of NGOs. The informal sector,
on the other hand, is composed of individual operators such as
money lenders and traders. The unregistered local rotating savings and
credit associations (ROSCAs), which are referred to in the localities
as the paluwagan, also form part of the informal sector.
Asymmetry in the Allocation of Credit
The credit requirements of microenterprises in the Philippines
are met by a variety of organizations belonging to the formal,
semiformal, and informal financial sectors. The institutions that
cater to the needs of microenterprises include rural banks, cooperatives, credit unions, and an estimated 500 – 600 credit-granting
NGOs (Llanto, Garcia, & Callanta, 1996). Within this roster of
organizations, the main institutions engaged in the delivery of microcredit are the NGOs operating as retail microfinance institutions.
While comparatively small in terms of size and outreach, NGOs tend
to concentrate their services on the needs of marginalized groups
in the country. On the other hand, the small rural banks serve
a cross section of small-scale borrowers and savers at the local level.
As in the corporate sector, the banking system is highly concentrated, with the six largest banks controlling close to 60% of
the assets of the banking system (World Bank, 2000). They are
owned and controlled by large domestic groups. The other 40%
are highly fragmented across the remaining 47 commercial banks,
117 thrift banks, and about 800 rural banks. Vos and Yap (1996)
point out that the structural problems in the Philippine financial
system are caused in part by the wide-ranging interlocking directorates and ownership patterns of the banking industry.
Furthermore, the distribution of bank offices is skewed towards the
National Capital Region, making banking services less accessible
to those in less-developed regions.
The unincorporated businesses and cooperatives are among
the types of borrowers that the commercial banking sector is not
Volume 6 Number 2
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able to extend loans to (Vos & Yap, 1996, p. 99). In contrast, private corporations in the Philippines, on average, receive 68–70% of
the loans coming from commercial bank establishments. This
asymmetry in the allocation of credit by the commercial banking
sector in the Philippines means that the credit needs of low-income
households must be supplied by other types of lenders. Thus,
within this financial environment, different institutional
approaches are adopted by various financial institutions designed
to better address the needs of this unserved market segment.

Institutional Approaches Adopted by Financial
Institutions in the Delivery of Microcredit
The Downgrading Approach: The Experience of Commercial
and Rural Banks
The notable increase in the involvement of formal financial institutions in the delivery of microfinance services comes as a result of
the expansion of the scope of formal institutions through downscaling and developing linkage programs with the different
organizations in the semiformal sector. This setup allows formal
financial players to get acquainted with the practices of those
directly involved in lending to small-scale borrowers. The perceived presence of competition among these banks has forced a
number of them to diversify into new markets. Some have sought
a new public image, while others, who have heard of the profits of
successful microfinance institutions, have developed an interest in
this unexplored market. In the last five years, the exploration of this
new market has been facilitated by donor-funded loan guarantees, central bank rediscount lines, and specialized technical assistance.
In the Philippines, the government exerts pressure on banks to
pay attention to the credit requirements of specific unserved sections of the economy through such instruments as the Magna
Carta for Small and Medium Enterprises, which mandates the
banking system to allocate 6% of its loans to small enterprises and
another 2% to medium enterprises.3 In March 2001, the Central
Bank (BSP) reported that the banking system as a whole complied
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with both the 6% and 2% mandatory credit allocation requirement. Table 3 shows that commercial banks accounted for 81% of
the total credit allocation for SMEs, illustrating the impact of its
size of operations. However, the banks’ response to small borrowers’ demand for financial services was limited to granting
wholesale funds retailed to NGOs and other MFIs operating under
the semiformal sector, or to purchasing government securities as an
alternative compliance with the loan quota (G. Aquino, personal
communication, 6 September 2001). The commercial banks allocated as much as ten times the mandated amount for medium
enterprises, while thrift banks posted even higher percentages of
credit allocation (21.39%) to the same sector. These figures help
illustrate which groups of enterprises within the SME sector are
preferred to be serviced by the different banks.
Table 3. Distribution of mandated credit allocation by bank
category
6% ALLOCATION
SMALL ENT.

FOR

Amount
Commercial Banks 102.7
(incl. foreign banks)
Thrift Banks
17.4
Rural Banks
7.7
TOTAL BANKING
127.8
SYSTEM

2% ALLOCATION
MEDIUM ENT.

FOR

% Dist.

Amount

80.4

82.7

13.6
6.0
100.0

15.9
2.4
101.0

% Dist.
81.9

15.7
2.4
100.0

PERCENTAGE
COMPLIANCE

OF

Allocation
6%
2%

11.34

23.35
28.69
12.69

9.12

21.39
9.03
10.03

Note. Mandated 8% credit allocation requirement for the SME Sector. From Bangko
Sentral ng Philipinas (BSP), 2001.

The size of the banks and their specialization heavily determine
how they cater to the financial needs of the low-income market
segment and their ability to resolve the key constraints encountered in dealing with this market. The Rizal Banking Corporation
(RCBC), one of the top five commercial banks in the Philippines,
for example, offers a minimum savings account balance of P5,000
($91) and a minimum loanable amount of P500,000 ($9,100). Its
asset writing policy is very strict with collateral, and it requires a
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20% – 30% nominal return on investments. It has a small and
medium business unit within the bank office, which is, however, not
very profitable and is only maintained in order to meet the government credit-allocation requirement. Without this mandate, RCBC
acknowledges that it would not even think of lending to small
business, much less to microenterprises (Goodwin-Groen, 1998).
Another example is the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (PCIB), which initiated the PCIB Moneyshop in 1973. The
moneyshop was put up among the many stalls in public markets
and offered working capital to different market vendors. It provided
easy access to established on-site banking facilities where money
could be borrowed conveniently. The operations were adjusted to the
business patterns in the market place, such as ensuring that the
moneyshop’s operations began in the early hours of the morning.
Collectors went to the individual borrowers instead of waiting for
payment at the moneyshop window. Despite the daily collection
system adopted, however, a significant percentage of loans in
arrears incurred or held in litigation remained considerably high,
higher at any rate than the levels usually tolerated by the banking
system. Moreover, it was not as successful as the credit unions in
attracting savings among its clientele. 4 While PCIB may have
deviated from its traditional banking procedures in order to meet
client demands, it was not able to establish with its clients a kind
of “personalistic relationship,” 5 which is characteristic of the ties
that exist among different actors in the informal financial sector.
In this case, moneyshop collectors may have gone to the individual
borrowers to collect payment and still faced borrower-default partly
because they are still perceived as “outsiders.”
The experience of large commercial banks directly involved
with microfinance activities generally tends to show that (1) there is
still a strong perception among commercial bank managers that
banking with small-scale clients is not a viable venture to undertake and (2) large commercial banks are not equipped with the
skills and technology necessary to profitably engage in providing microcredit and other microfinance services. Although the BSP
is pushing the banking sector to get more involved in microfinance
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activities, it is aware of the difficulties and limitations faced by large
commercial banks in serving this market.
On the other hand, the rural banks in the Philippines have been
traditionally more involved in microlending than their counterparts in the commercial banking sector. The relative size of their
operations and the location of their offices and branches in the
municipalities help minimize the operational constraints and the
physical limitations encountered by other commercial banks. A
number of rural banks, for example, accepted deposits as small as
P100 ($1.90) and provided loans as low as P1,000 ($19) (Llanto,
Garcia, & Callanta, 1996). 6 With reference to the SME credit
allocation requirement, the rural banks posted a higher share
(28.69%) in allocating credit to small enterprises, compared to
what the commercial banking sector contributed (11.34%).
Rural banks show a greater propensity to serve low-income borrowers. However, even given these figures, a considerable number
of rural banks are still adamant about positively responding to the
BSP’s call for increased lending to microenterprises and SMEs. This
is born out of a group-banking trauma that the rural banking sector
suffered from its experience in the late 1970s and 1980s with the
targeted credit schemes of the government, most notably the
Masagana ’99. 7 The medium-term effect of this experience was a
strong negative sentiment against group lending and a conservative, risk-averse lending practice by rural banks.
The successful experience of credit-granting NGOs and credit
cooperatives, however, has drawn attention to the profit potential
from serving the low-income market segment. This success has
encouraged many rural bankers, especially those faced with less
opportunity to tap into the higher end of the credit market in the
localities where they operate, to reconsider their involvement in
microlending. With encouragement from the government and technical support from international donors, the number of rural banks
involved in microfinance is reported to be gradually increasing.8
Microcredit delivery among rural banks is being vigorously
supported by both government and donors in view of the rural
banks’ comparative advantage over other players in the financial
Volume 6 Number 2
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sector. Their location in the municipalities and smaller towns
affords them the opportunity of personally knowing the target
clientele. Besides, small-scale borrowers may find it more comfortable to deal with rural banks, as poor clients have a tendency to
perceive commercial banks to be more oriented towards the higher
end of the credit market. The existing physical infrastructure
of rural banks also provides them with an advantage over other
microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as cooperatives and creditgranting NGOs, making it more practicable for rural banks to
expand and reach out to a substantial number of small-scale clients.
Moreover, rural banks also have the legal capacity to mobilize
deposits, which does not make them dependent on donor
resources in capitalizing their lending operations.
However, many rural bankers agree that doing microfinance
takes more than just opening a special microlending window or unit
within the bank. The experience of the New Rural Bank of San
Leonardo (NRBSL) in Nueva Ecija shows that getting into microfinance successfully was very much a matter of building the right
image among its target clients. Its CEO and owner had to join his
staff in launching a massive small deposit campaign within the
town by going from door to door of every household. This helped
establish the bank’s image of being friendly to the low-end market
(A. Panganiban, NRBSL CEO, personal communication, 25
September 2001).
The experience of rural banks in serving the low-income market segment shows the following: (1) Microlending by rural banks
necessitates having a “champion” who will ensure the success of the
microlending operation. In the case of the NRBSL, the personal
commitment of the owner and managers of the bank to help
introduce and sustain its microlending operations was pivotal in
establishing credibility among their targeted clientele. (2) The
rural banks also have the opportunity to treat their microlending
operations as an adjunct to their other banking functions. This
means that these banks are not solely dependent on the gains from
its microfinance operations. Initially, they may experience high
transaction costs associated with dealing with low-income clients,
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and thus the return on their microlending programs will require a
certain volume to achieve economies of scale. Within this phase of
building up their pool of clients, rural banks may also benefit
from the gains realized from their other operations. (3) Another
ingredient in the success of microlending by rural banks is the
environment where they operate. The presence, for example, of
an existing sizeable group of microentrepreneurs within the locality, as in the case of NRBSL, provides banks with the necessary
demand requirement. The Microenterprise Access to Banking
Services (MABS) Program reports that rural banks applying for
training in microfinance have been those concentrated in areas
where a growing number of businesses may be found, such as the
more densely populated provinces of Laguna in central Luzon
and Cebu in the southern part of the Philippines. While many
banks must still face a number of constraints in dealing with the
low-income market segment, the comparative advantage that
comes with their status as banks lures a number of credit-granting
NGOs to explore the prospects of transforming into regulated
financial institutions.
The Upgrading of Credit-Granting NGOs into Banks
The upgrading of credit-granting NGOs provides a promising
means by which many of these organizations are able to mobilize
savings or refinance their lending operations directly on the market.
According to a monitoring study conducted by the Philippine
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), as of
1996, there were already as many as 600 NGOs involved in microfinance throughout the country, with combined total assets of P45. 5
million (equivalent to almost $1 million). Their loan portfolio was
estimated at approximately P920 million (approximately $17 million), which is equivalent to 2.5% of that of rural banks.
Notwithstanding this, mature credit-granting NGOs in the
Philippines are still observed to suffer from limited outreach. Llanto
and Chua (1998) point out that these NGOs have an outreach
capacity of only 1,000 on average. Moreover, NGOs are hampered by
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their weak institutional capacity, especially in the areas of financial
management, resource mobilization, and product development.
The marked increase in the capitalization requirement for the
establishment of banks clearly makes it harder for credit-granting
NGOs to transform themselves even into small banks. By 1996, two
of the best-performing credit-granting NGOs in the country were
already applying for rural banking licenses with the BSP.
However, when the BSP raised the minimum capital requirement,
one of the applicants was forced to withdraw. The remaining
applicant, the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development
(CARD), was the only NGO able to meet the said capitalization
requirement and received its license to operate as a rural bank in
December 1996. 9 Given this constraint, credit-granting NGOs
either turn to international donors for capitalization support or
merge with other NGOs in order to raise the necessary capital to
put up a bank. The Alliance of Philippine Partners in Enterprise
Development (APPEND), a group of six NGOs, recognized that
it had to capitalize on the collective strength of their networks
and establish a partnership with a foreign donor, Opportunity
International, in order to open up a microfinance bank in
Antipolo City (north of the capital) called the Opportunity
Microfinance Bank (OMB) in August 2001.
The impact of transforming credit-granting NGOs into formal
financial institutions can be felt in many areas of the organizations’
microfinance operations. The case of CARD shows that its transformation into a bank helped facilitate its growth in outreach,
which soared to 10,868 in 1997 and more than doubled (26,369)
by June 1999 (Seibel & Torres, 1999). The transformation subjects
MFIs to certain performance standards imposed upon them by the
regulatory agency for the maintenance of their license. The discipline that develops from their obligation to meet these standards
strengthens their drive towards sustainability and supports their
determination to broaden and deepen their outreach. As observed
by the proponents of CARD Rural Bank, such performance standards were missing prior to their transformation, as they were not
always enforced by the donors from whom their lending funds
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were sourced. This is affirmed by Tulay sa Pag-unlad Development
Corporation (TSPI), the leading credit-granting NGO in the
country, which is planning to set up the TSPI Thrift Bank soon. Its
executive director considers the regulation and supervision of the
BSP as a safeguard against funds-mismanagement and evidence of
the credibility of an NGO as a viable credit-granting institution
(R. De Lara, TSPI Executive Director, personal communication,
26 September 2001).
While transformation presents many MFIs the opportunity to
mobilize cheaper sources of finance through deposits and may help
strengthen their credibility as viable financial players, transforming
into regulated financial institutions may not be every MFI’s cup of
tea. As transformation into banks may be deemed cumbersome
for some NGOs, a number of them opt for establishing linkage relationships with bigger commercial banks. This approach, as we will
see in the succeeding section, allows credit-granting NGOs and
formal financial institutions to capitalize on each other’s strength
and specialization in the delivery of financial services.

Linking Credit-Granting NGOs and
the Formal Financial Sector
The linkage model used in the Philippines utilizes credit-granting
NGOs to fulfill a financial intermediary function between the
bank or a wholesale financial institution and organized self-help
groups or individual borrowers. This role requires NGOs to
accept the contractual responsibility for the repayment of the line
of credit extended to it by the bank. The final lending to end borrowers is done through the use of self-help groups or on an individual borrower basis. In many cases, the NGO also assumes the
responsibility for the extension of consultancy services to and the
training of the different groups of end clients.
Such a linkage model is illustrated in the case of the People’s
Credit and Finance Corporation (PCFC) which was established
by the Philippine government to wholesale resources to creditgranting NGOs following the Grameen model. As an apex financial institution, PCFC works with a number of retailers and
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conduits such as credit-granting NGOs, cooperatives, and rural
banks. By August 2001, its number of retailers had hit 185, 100 of
which were banks. PCFC sources its funds mainly from local and
international agencies at concessional rates and lends these funds
out to its retailers effectively at 12%, with a 1% fee for processing.
No collateral is required on the part of its conduits, although security is established through the assignment of promissory notes
from the conduit’s end borrowers. PCFC has no direct linkage with
the end borrowers of its conduits and only specifies that loanable
amounts to end clients should not exceed P25,000 ($460).
Figure 1. The linkage model adopted by the People’s Credit &
Financial Corporation (PCFC)
Thrift Banks
Rural Banks
Multilateral
Devlopment
Banks

Government
Agencies

People’s
Credit & Finance
Corporation (PCFC)

Cooperative
Banks

End
Borrowers

Cooperatives
NGOs
Lending
Investors

Another example of financial linkages established is that
between the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), a commercial
bank, and the Project Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups
(PLBS), an initiative conceived in 1987 with the support of the
German Office for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The PLBS was
an initiative covering four project phases, linking NGOs, cooperatives, and self-help groups to credit and savings facilities established by the Landbank of the Philippines (LBP) and a number
of participating rural banks.
Through the BPI Foundation, BPI has provided TSPI with a
line of credit initially amounting to P1.5 million ($28,000) at 8%
per annum, and two other lines of credit to be further on-lent to
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Figure 2. The linkage model adopted by the project “Linking Banks
& Self-Help Groups”
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Figure 3. The linkage model adopted by the Bank of the Philippine
Islands
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Association
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two other NGOs which TSPI collaborates with. BPI’s initial total
engagement as of 1997 reached P3.5million ($64,000), forming
part of its pilot program of banking with the poor (GoodwinGroen, 1998). The credit lines are provided for an original term of
12 months but are renewable annually subject to credit review and
evaluation. For security and collateral, BPI requires promissory
notes executed by the microentrepreneur clients of the creditgranting NGOs, or promissory notes executed by the primary
NGO (TSPI), which acts as an agent between BPI and its two
other partner-NGOs on a with-recourse basis. The NGOs are
expected to submit quarterly reports on the status of the assigned
notes and charges 2% per month on the overdue and defaulted
amounts. By early 1997, BPI had accumulated 11 loans outstanding to MFIs for a total value of P11.1million ($202,000).
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By establishing links with formal financial institutions which are
constrained in directly dealing with the small-borrower market
segment, NGOs have the opportunity to increase their capital
base. The advantage of mobilizing NGOs as credit-conduits is
that many of them have been organized primarily to serve the poor
sectors of society. The experience of NGOs in dealing with the
small-borrower segment over the years has endowed them with the
capacity to know the target clientele and become familiar with
their needs. Thus, given their practical experience and their social
orientation, which put them on good standing among the many
end borrowers they serve, NGOs play a vital role as intermediaries between the banks and the end borrowers.
The problem that arises from this financial linkage approach,
however, is that many formal financial institutions engaged in this
approach already observe that a saturation level is being reached
on the number of possible NGO candidate conduits. PCFC, for
example, observed that among its roster of partners, many were
already showing signs of organizational deficiency (J. Medina,
personal communication, 26 September 2001). Moreover, among
the 54 members of the Philippine Microfinance Coalition and the
approximately 500 existing credit-granting NGOs in the country,
only a handful of NGOs are able to meet the requirements of the
leading commercial banks in the establishment of linkage relationships (E. Garcia, personal communication, 13 September 2001). In
the experience of PLBS, it was recognized during the early stages of
the project that the institutional capacity of many NGOs was
keeping them from effectively linking with banks (A. Almendral, personal communication, 19 September 2001). Hence, the team
endeavored to reorient the direction of the project during the latter phases and explored working with the cooperative sector
instead. More importantly, unlike PCFC and LBP, which are
partly government-owned entities, commercial banks are not in a
position to assist these organizations in building their institutional capacities for more effective engagement in financial intermediation. In contrast, PCFC and LBP are in a more advantageous
position to make use of the support extended by international
130
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donors to assist partner NGOs in building up the latter’s institutional capacity.
Building Specialized Institutions from Scratch
Apart from the institutional approaches of downgrading, upgrading, and financial linkage-building, the approach of introducing
new types of institutions from scratch or hybrids of more traditional types of organizations like commercial banks, such as the
newly-established microfinance or microenterprise banks, certainly
presents the opportunity to look at how these new institutions differ from their counterparts in the general banking sector. Whether
these new institutions are able to effectively overcome the constraints in dealing with the lower-income market segment while at
the same time provide financial services to the target clientele on a
sustainable basis is an area of study that will be of interest to many
researchers. In the Philippines, the introduction of such
specialized institutions is evidenced by the launching of the
Micro-Enterprise Bank (MEB) in Mindanao (the southern part of
the Philippines) in late 2001. MEB is a joint venture among international investors and a local counterpart, the Planter’s
Development Bank group. Recently, other similar developments
have also taken place in Batangas (south of Manila) with the
creation of Bangko ng Masa (Bank of the Poor), a private local
undertaking.

Concluding Remarks
The characteristics of the different players in the Philippine
financial sector outlined in this paper underscore the available opportunities and the constraints that may be dealt with in designing
approaches to help address the credit needs of microenterprises. It
should not, however, escape the reader that given the oligopolistic
nature of the Philippine financial system, the expectation that
current bank restructuring will result in improved access of smaller
enterprises to bank credit is very much clouded with skepticism
(Vos & Yap, 1996).
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In the Philippines, the commercialization of microfinance
activities has led to the emergence of new types of institutions and
has helped define some approaches markedly different from those
which were used when microfinance was dominantly viewed as a
purely social activity. This is a continuing process which requires
changes in perception among the different players in the financial
market. New methods and approaches need to be continuously
introduced in the provision of services and in mobilizing resources.
As has been shown, the appropriate strategies needed in widening
and deepening the credit reach of the various players in the financial
sector are those which recognize the market specialization of
each group of lenders and at the same time provide incentives for
institutions to be able to effectively transform and develop into
institutions more capable of addressing the credit needs of the
small-borrower market segment.

Notes
1. The Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) is a series of nationwide surveys
conducted by the Philippine National Statistics Office in 1998, 1999, and 2002.
Only preliminary results of the 2002 APIS are available.
2. Alfonso, Borton, and Castello (1994) note that there are considerable differences
in the financial services demanded and the constraints that different microenterprises face in gaining access to sources of finance, depending on the size of the
enterprise. See also Lapar (1991). For more in-depth discussion on the nature of credit
transactions involving microenterprises, please see Rhyne and Otero (1994), p. 12;
Reed and Befus (1994), pp. 186–188; and Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), pp.
265–269.
3. RA 8289 serves as an amendment to RA 6977, which was enacted in 1991,
mandating all financial institutions to set aside certain portions of their loan portfolio for small enterprises. The portion mandated for allocation to SMEs based on RA
6977 was at least 5% by the end of 1991, raised to 10% by the end of 1992 until
1995, and 5% by the end of 1996. In 1997, RA 6977 was amended through RA 8289,
which extended the mandatory allocation feature of the law for another ten years,
from 1997 to 2007. Allocation requirements were adjusted to 6% and 2% for small
and medium enterprises, respectively. (Philippine Department of Trade & Industry,
1997.)
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4. Further information on this case can be found at http://gdrc.org/icm/
inspire/inspire.html.
5. This term was used by Floro & Yotopolous (1991).
6. These include the Cooperative Rural Bank of Aklan, the Davao Cooperative
Bank, and other cooperative banks in Mindanao (southern part of the Philippines).
7. In the early 1980s, the rural banks, along with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), a state-owned bank, were pushed to implement Masagana ’99 and various
subsidized lending programs primarily to farmer groups. The funds were provided by
the Central Bank, but liability resided with the rural banks. These programs resulted
in poor loan performance partly brought about by the fact that borrowers immediately perceived the funds as government aid. Hence, credit discipline in the repayment of loans was not maintained. Also, as a supply-driven approach, the lending
programs failed to consider the benefits of the savings-mobilization component
among the targeted groups. When what seemed to be a steady inflow of cheap money
dried up in the early 1980s, many rural banks failed. While the government bailed
PNB out, it was not able to do the same for participating rural banks. About 450 from
a total of 1,250 rural banks collapsed during this crisis (GTZ, 1997, pp. 4–5).
8. The Microenterprise Access to Banking Services Program (MABS), an initiative co-sponsored by USAID Philippines and the Rural Bankers Association of the
Philippines (RBAP), shows that as of April 2001, the number of rural bank branches
involved in the program reached a total of 57, more than the targeted goal of 48. This
number had further gone up to 66 by the end of July 2001. No capitalization assistance is given and loans are funded from the deposit base of the participating rural
banks.
9. For more in-depth discussion on the transformation process of CARD Rural
Bank, see Seibel and Torres (1999). As of 2003, there were three transformed MFIs
operating as banks with microfinance functions in the Philippines, namely, (1) CARD
Rural Bank in Laguna (rural bank), (2) Opportunity Microfinance Bank in Rizal
Province (thrift bank), and (3) Vision Bank in Catanduanes (rural bank).
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Microleasing
The Grameen Bank Experience
Asif Ud Dowla
Abstract: Grameen Bank was the first microfinance institution (MFI) to introduce microleasing on a large scale. This paper provides a preliminary evaluation
of Grameen's leasing program. Instead of providing a full-fledged impact assessment study, we examine the terms and conditions of the leasing program and
evaluate its success in terms of outreach, repayment rate, and asset ownership.
Analysis of program level data shows that the program is successful in terms of
outreach and repayment performance. Through the program, poor men and
women have become owners of power tillers, power looms, shallow machines,
cellular phones, and even computers. The success of leasing suggests some
important lessons for MFIs. It shows that poor people have diverse credit needs
and that to help the poor borrowers to graduate out of poverty, MFIs have to
provide different and flexible products.

I

n 1992 Grameen Bank started its experimental leasing program
by leasing power looms to weavers in Ariahazar, near Dhaka,
the capital city of Bangladesh. Many of the borrowers in this
area were weavers who produced fabrics using handlooms. The
borrowers noticed that many of their competitors were using power
looms and wanted to know if the bank would help them to gain
access to power looms. Initially, the bank bought the power loom
and rented it out to the borrowers. However, the bank manager
realized that the borrowers would be better served through an
arrangement where the machines could be leased to the borrowers,
who could then pay off the cost of the machines by using the earnings from them. Based on this experience, in 1993 Grameen Bank

